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We report results from economic experiments of decisions that are best described as petty larceny,
with high school and college students who can anonymously steal real money from each other. Our
design allows exogenous variation in the rewards of crime, and the penalty and probability of detection.
We find that the probability of stealing is increasing in the amount of money that can be stolen, and
that it is decreasing in the probability of getting caught and in the penalty for getting caught. Furthermore,
the impact of the certainty of getting caught is larger when the penalty is bigger, and the impact of
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Becker (1968) created the foundation for the economic analysis of criminal behavior. 
Since then, economists have extended his basic theoretical framework in several directions, 
but the basic argument remains – participation in crime is the result of an optimizing 
individual’s response to incentives such as the expected payoffs from criminal activity and 
the costs, notably the probability of apprehension and the severity of punishment.
1  Since the 
early empirical research that reported evidence that deterrence reduces crime (Ehrlich 1973;  
Ehrlich 1975; Witte 1980; Layson 1985), the main challenge in empirical analysis has been 
to tackle the simultaneity between criminal activity and deterrence. Specifically, an increase 
in deterrence is expected to reduce criminal activity, but a change in crime is also expected to 
prompt an increase in the certainty and severity of punishment, through mechanisms such as 
an increase in the arrest rate and/or the size of the police force. This makes it difficult to 
identify the causal impact of deterrence on crime.
2   
Recent research has employed three types of strategies to overcome the simultaneity 
problem. The first solution is to find an instrument that is correlated with deterrence 
measures, but uncorrelated with crime. An example is Levitt (2002) who used the number of 
per capita municipal firefighters as an instrument for police effort. The second strategy is to 
use high-frequency time-series data. For example, in monthly data, an increase in the police 
force in a given month will affect criminal activity in the same month, but an increase in 
crime cannot alter the size of the police force in that same month because of the much longer  
                                                 
1 See, for example, Ehrlich 1973, Block and Heineke 1975, Schmidt and Witte 1984, Flinn 1986, Mocan et al., 
2005.  
2  See Ehrlich (1996) for a discussion of related theoretical and empirical issues.   2 
 
lag between a policy decision to increase the working police force and the actual deployment 
of police officers on the street. This identification strategy has been employed by Corman 
and Mocan (2000, 2005). The third strategy is to find a natural experiment which generates a 
truly exogenous variation in deterrence, as in Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004), who use the 
increase in police protection around Jewish institutions in Buenos Aires after a terrorist 
attack to identify the impact of police presence on car thefts, and  Drago, Galbiati and 
Vertova (2009) who exploit the exogenous nature of a clemency bill passed by the Italian 
Parliament in 2006 to estimate the impact of recidivism to expected punishment.  
  Although these empirical strategies have permitted researchers to refine and improve 
upon earlier estimates, a convincing natural experiment is very difficult to find, the validity 
of any instrumental variable can always be questioned, and one can argue that if policy 
makers have foresight about future crime rates, low frequency data could also suffer from 
simultaneity bias.
3   
In this paper, we use an economic experiment to investigate individual responses to 
unambiguously exogenous changes in the rewards and penalties of criminal behavior. The 
experiment involves decisions about actions that can best be described as petty larceny – 
stealing money from another individual, with a chance of getting caught and having to repay 
everything taken and a penalty in terms of a monetary fine. The subjects are high school and 
college students, and the experiment is done using real money payoffs. Our protocol used 
loaded language, such as “criminal,” “victim” and “steal from the victim” to provide explicit 
                                                 
3  Similar difficulties exist in identifying the effect of unemployment and wages on crime. For example, 
although increases in minimum wages can be argued as being exogenous to crime, the case is less compelling 
for wages in general, and for the unemployment rate. For various identification strategies see (Hansen and 
Machin 2002, Gould, Weinberg and Mustard 2002, Machin and Meghir 2004, Corman and Mocan 2005,  
Mocan and Unel 2011).   3 
reminders of the dishonest and wrong nature of the act. We collect information on (nearly) 
simultaneous choices to steal made by individuals facing a variety of different criminal 
opportunities and tradeoffs between the benefits and costs. In addition to the analysis of  how 
individuals respond to exogenous changes in the costs and benefits of crime, another 
contribution of the paper is an experimental design that allows us to evaluate the impact of 
the certainty and the severity of punishment independently and simultaneously. In contrast, 
empirical studies of crime are generally unable to include measures of both the certainty and 
the severity of punishment, as we explain below. 
The experimental economics literature on tax compliance is related to this paper, but 
there are substantive differences between our experiment and those employed in tax 
compliance studies (Alm and McKee 2006;  Alm and McKee 2004; Alm McClelland and 
Schulze 1992). The design of most tax compliance experiments involves subjects who are 
given a certain amount of income and who decide on how much of this income to report. 
Subjects pay taxes on reported income at declared tax rates. Tax evasion is discovered by a 
random audit and a fine is paid on unpaid taxes. This process is repeated for a number of 
periods which constitute a session. The impact of a policy change is identified by between-
session variation of a parameter such as the audit rate. This is because, by design, all subjects 
are exposed to one set of parameters that do not change over the course of the experiment 
(session).
4  In contrast, as explained below, our design identifies the effects of the costs and 
benefits of committing a crime from within-subject variation. Also, in tax experiments tax 
evasion by the subjects typically amounts to taking money away from the experimenter. In 
                                                 
4 One exception is Alm and McKee (2006) where each subject faces one tax rate, one penalty rate, but two audit 
rates.   4 
our design subjects steal money from another participant. Section II provides description of 
the experimental design. Section III presents the results, and section IV concludes.  
 
 
II. Experimental Design 
The experiments were conducted with public high school and college students, with 
IRB approval. Following standard economic experimental protocols we provided complete 
information to the participants, paid them privately in cash, and there was no deception. 
Before the experiment, the students read an assent agreement and were allowed to opt out of 
the experiment, but none did. Because public school attendance rates are high, this procedure 
provides a fairly representative sample of the area high school age population. However, the 
sample is not nationally representative – Eugene is a medium sized college town with a 
population where per capita income and the proportion of whites are higher than the U.S. 
average.
5      
 Each participant was randomly given an endowment of $8, $12, or $16. Their basic 
decision was how much additional money, if any, to steal from an anonymous partner, given 
specified probabilities of getting caught and specified fines that must be paid if caught. Our 
protocol emphasized that the subject’s decision would involve what was described as the 
criminal act of stealing money from a victim. This language was used to emphasize that this 
was not a game of chance, and that the decision to steal would involve taking money from a 
victim in the class, and not from the experimenter.  More specifically, the subjects were told 
that 
                                                 
5 As Levitt and List (2007) underscore, self-selection of subjects into an experiment may diminish the 
generalizability of the results. In our high school experiments there was no self-selection effect, since all the 
students agreed to participate. Selection in terms of who was recruited was small, since high school attendance 
is high. Selection on both counts is more significant with our college sample.    5 
 
“The criminal will have a chance to steal some of the victim’s money. 
However, stealing is not without a risk. If the criminal decides to steal 
some of the victim’s money, there is a chance that the criminal is 
caught. If the criminal is caught, then he or she will have to return the 
money taken from the victim, and also pay a fine to the experimenter. 
The chance that the criminal is caught, and the amount of the fine, 
depend on the choice made by the criminal.”  
  
 
 Everyone made a decision as if they were the criminal, and we then randomly and 
anonymously paired subjects and randomly determined actual roles (criminal or victim) 
within each pair, for the purpose of determining the payoffs. The subjects knew the other 
participants, but they did not know whom they would steal from, or who stole from them, 
even after the end of the experiment. Anonymity was used in part to eliminate uncontrolled 
partner specific effects, and in part because of IRB concerns about retaliation. 
Subjects made a series of decisions from 13 different choice sets. Each choice set 
included a list of alternative choices, and subjects were told to pick one alternative from each 
choice set. Each alternative choice involved different combinations of stolen money, the 
probability of getting caught, and the fine that had to be paid if caught. Therefore, each 
alternative can be thought of as a different possible crime. Some potential crimes involved 
stealing a little amount of money, facing a good chance of getting away with it and a modest 
fine if caught. Others involved a larger amount of money, but a lesser chance of getting away 
with it, and so on. Not to steal was always an option. Table 1 displays the menu of bundles 
for a representative choice set (Choice Set #5 in the experiment). The complete protocol is 
given in the Appendix. 
Each subject made one choice from 13 different choice sets, presented in random 
order. Ten of the choice sets involved alternatives with negative tradeoffs between the   6 
characteristics of the stealing choices: choices with more loot meant higher probabilities of 
getting caught and higher fines. Three choice sets involved choices where increasing the loot 
was possible while holding the probability and the fine constant, at various levels. Table 2 
shows summary information for each of the choice sets, specifically, the minimum and 
maximums of the possible loot, the probability of getting caught, and the fine that must be 
paid if caught. 
Participants knew their endowment, but not that of their partner. The amount of 
money that could be stolen ranged from $0 to $8. We included this variation to see if an 
exogenous change in money income changes decisions about stealing. These are relatively 
high financial stakes. Eight dollars is about half the average weekly discretionary spending of 
a high school student, and it is 1/10
th of the weekly spending for a college student.  
After subjects made a choice from each of the 13 choice sets we randomly and 
anonymously paired them, then randomly determined which of each pair was the criminal 
and which the victim. One of the criminal’s choice sets was randomly chosen, and the choice 
they made from that particular set was implemented for that pair. If the criminal did choose 
to steal, we used a randomized procedure to determine whether they got away with it, or were 
caught and had to return any stolen money to the victim and also pay the fine. The criminal 
and the victim were then paid the resulting amounts in cash in sealed envelopes.  
The experiments were conducted in three high school classes in Eugene, Oregon and 
two undergraduate classes at the University of Oregon, for a total of 82 high school students 
and 34 college students. We collected data on standard socio-demographic characteristics of 
the high school subjects in a post-experiment survey in order to investigate their relationship 
with participants’ choices. Definitions and descriptive statistics of these variables are   7 
provided in Table 3. Oldest Child is a dichotomous variable to indicate if the subject is the 
oldest (or only) child in his or her family. Years in Eugene stands for the number of years the 
subject has lived in Oregon - a larger value may be considered as a proxy for enhanced ties to 




In this section we report the results of the analyses on individuals’ decisions 
regarding whether or not to steal. First, the hypothesis that people will not steal from each 
other is not supported, on average. Table 4 presents the distribution of the number of thefts. 
During the experiment each individual had the opportunity to steal 13 times. Thus, zero thefts 
means that the individual never stole during the experiment, while a 13 indicates that he or 
she stole something in every choice set. As Table 4 demonstrates, there is substantial 
variation in the number of thefts. Ten percent of the subjects stole five or fewer times. Forty-
seven percent of the subjects stole 13 times during the experiment; that is, they stole some 
amount of money in very choice set. 
We exploited the panel nature of the data and estimated the effects of loot, 
probability, and fines on the decision to steal, as follows.  Let Yi stand for the indicator 
variable that takes the value of one if the individual decides to steal, and zero otherwise; and 
let P stand for the vector that consists of the values of the loot, the probability of getting 
caught, and the fine, associated with that choice. Assume that subject i has decided to steal in 
a given choice set – for example, suppose she has decided to choose the last theft in choice 
set 5, shown in Table 1.  She has chosen a crime with loot of $8, a probability of being 
caught of 75%, and a fine of $5.50 if caught. From her observed choice we can make the 
revealed preference argument that this theft dominates the option not to steal, so Yi=1 with   8 
these values of the loot, the probability of being caught, and the fine that are associated with 
this crime P=($8, 75%, $5.50).
6  
A subject, who has decided not to steal from a given choice set, has made a series of 
decisions not to steal, each relative to the option of stealing. So, again using choice set 5 as 
an example, the choice with loot = $2, probability of being caught =75%, and fine =$0.10 
was not enough for him to make the decision to steal. Thus, in this case, Yi=0, and P=($2, 
75%, $0.10). The same is true for all other alternatives that involve stealing money in this 
choice set, and so Y=0 for all other P vectors in choice set 5, given that the person did not 
steal in that particular choice set. 
Table 5 presents the results of the regressions using these data. In these and all other 
regressions, standard errors are clustered at the individual level.  The models behind columns 
(1)-(3) include individual fixed-effects.  An increase in the loot is expected to increase the 
probability of committing theft. On the other hand, an increase in the probability of getting 
caught and an increase in the fine should deter the individual from stealing. Column (1) 
presents the results from the high school sample, and column (2) reports the results based on 
the sample of college students. In both cases, an increase in the loot increases the propensity 
to steal and an increase in fine decreases that propensity. The same is true for the probability 
of getting caught, although the coefficient is insignificant in the college sample. When we 
estimated the model by pooling high school and college students, and interacting the 
explanatory variables with an indicator variable that identifies the high school students, we 
could not reject the hypothesis that the coefficients were the same between the two groups.
7  
                                                 
6 There could be another theft option in the same choice set that could have enticed the subject to steal (see the 7 
theft options in Table 1), but given that the subject was allowed to make only one choice from each choice set, 
we do not observe his second, or third-best theft choices. 
7 The F-value of the joint significance of the interaction terms was1.21 with a p-value of 0.31.   9 
Therefore, we estimated the model using the entire sample, which consists of 3,135 
observations from 116 subjects. The results, reported in column (3) show that the point 
estimates of the variables are almost identical to those reported in columns (1) and (2), and 
that they are highly statistically significant.  
The results in columns (1)-(3) of Table 5 indicate that a $1 increase in the amount of 
money that is available to steal (loot) increases the probability of theft by 3 percentage 
points. The mean value of the loot in the sample is $3.82, and the baseline theft propensity is 
0.36. Thus, the elasticity of theft with respect to money available to steal is 0.32.   
Important policy questions hinge on the relative deterrent effects of increased fines 
versus increased chances of apprehension. Ideally, empirical studies would be done with data 
that includes independent changes of both variables. However, in practice, empirical analyses 
do not include measures of both the probability of apprehension and the severity of 
punishment, because of the paucity of data. While it is possible to measure the probability of 
apprehension by arrest rates of particular crimes, the severity of punishment is difficult to 
quantify because data on conviction rates and average sentence lengths are noisy and they are 
not consistently available. Therefore, crime regressions typically include arrests rates or the 




                                                 
8  One exception is research on the impact of capital punishment, where empirical models include measures of 
the probability of arrest, the probability of conviction given arrest, and the probability of execution given 
conviction (Mocan and Gittings 2010, Mocan and Gittings 2003,  Ehrlich 1975).  Mustard (2003) has personally 
collected data on conviction rates and sentence lengths from four states and showed that the inability to include 
these variables because of the lack of data under-states the impact of the arrest rate as much as 50 percent. 
 
9 Over the last three decades the severity of punishment has been increased in many states in the U.S. with the 
implementation of sentencing guidelines and mandatory sentencing policies. However, these sentencing reforms 
are not exogenous events.  Furthermore, they generate reactions in the behavior of judges and prosecutors, 
which make certainty of punishment endogenous to these changes (Bushway, Owens and Piehl 2011, Miceli 
2008, Schanzenbach and Tilelr, 2007).   10 
 Our design allows us to exogenously vary both the certainty and the severity of 
punishment, and analyze the extent to which these variations induce a change in behavior.  
We find strong evidence for deterrence effect. Furthermore, our results show that the 
propensity to steal reacts more strongly to the penalty than to the probability of getting 
caught. This result is consistent with the theoretical models where the potential offender is 
risk averse (Ehrlich 1973).  With the simplest specification, column (3) in Table 5, we find 
that a one-percentage point increase in the probability of getting caught decreases the 
propensity to steal by 0.3 percentage points, which corresponds to an elasticity of -0.4.  This 
elasticity is very similar to the elasticity of felony crimes with respect to their own arrest 
rates reported by Corman and Mocan (2005) and in Levitt (1998).  Similarly, if the fine goes 
up by $1, we find the propensity to steal declines by about 5 percentage points, which 
corresponds to a fine elasticity of theft of -0.30.  
Column (4) of Table 5 presents the results from the linear probability model that 
includes personal background characteristics of the individuals instead of individual fixed-
effects. Because data on these characteristics are collected only from high school students, 
these regressions are restricted to the high school sample. Column (5) displays the marginal 
effects obtained from a probit regression, and demonstrates that neither the point estimates 
nor their statistical significance are altered by estimation methodology as the results are very 
similar to those reported in column (4).  The strong deterrence effect is confirmed in these 
specifications as well. An increase in the probability of getting caught, or in the amount of 
penalty reduces the incentive to steal as the estimated coefficients are highly significant in 
columns (4) and (5).    11 
The estimated impacts of personal attributes reveal interesting regularities. Males 
have a higher propensity to steal than females, which has been well-documented in empirical 
studies (Mocan and Rees 2005; Gottfredson and Hirshi 1990;  Hagan, Simpson and Gillis 
1979). The longer the individual has lived in the town where the experiments were 
conducted, the lower his/her propensity to steal. Specifically, an additional year of residence 
reduces the propensity to steal by about 2 percentage points. This result may be due to the 
fact that longer residency is correlated with stronger personal networks, which in turn 
reduces the propensity to steal - despite the fact that the victim is always anonymous. As 
Levitt and List (2007) describe, utility maximization in situations like this may also involve 
not only monetary payoffs, but also concerns about “doing the right thing” or “moral 
choices.” In our setting, the declining propensity to steal as a function of the length of 
residency in the city seems consistent with the hypothesis that difficult-to-observe 
determinants of behavior such as “morals” may in part be determined by considerations of 
the environment.
10  The significance of the residency variable suggests that the subjects did 
not treat the experiment as a game of chance - if they had, the length of residency would not 
have any impact on their behavior. 
Columns (4) and (5) also show that the age, the height and the GPA of the individual 
have no impact on the propensity to steal.
11 The same is true for the amount of money they 
spend each week. Similarly, the endowment given to them in the beginning of the experiment 
($8, $12 or $16) has no impact on the decision to steal. On the other hand, those who have 
two or more siblings have a higher propensity to steal in comparison to those who have one 
                                                 
10 This is consistent with the results of Mocan (2011). 
11  Adjusting for age, height could be a proxy of the uterine environment (including disease and 
mother’s nutrition intake) and childhood nutrition and therefore a marker for cognitive ability (see 
Case and Paxson 2008, Resnik 2002, and literature they cite).   12 
sibling or no siblings. This result is in line with a large literature in economics, sociology and 
demography which demonstrates the negative impact of family size on child outcomes 
(Blake 1991, Becker and Lewis 1973, Downey 1995, Caceres-Delpiano 2006).
12 
In our final specifications we added an additional explanatory variable, the interaction 
term between the probability of getting caught and the fine to the specifications. The 
hypothesis is that the marginal effect of a given increase in the probability of getting caught 
should be increasing in the fine, (or alternatively that the marginal impact of the fine should 
be increasing in the probability of getting caught.) The results are reported in Table 6. As 
before, all standard errors are clustered at the individual-level. Columns (1) and (2) report the 
results of the models that employ the high school sample and the full sample, respectively. 
The estimated coefficients are almost identical in both samples. As expected, the interaction 
term between the probability of getting caught and fine is negative and statistically 
significant. Using the estimates in column (2) we find that the impact on the propensity to 
steal of a one-percentage point rise in the probability of getting caught, evaluated at the mean 
value of fine ($2.12) is equal to -0.003   (0.001-0.002x2.12). This means, for instance, that a 
five percentage point increase in the probability of detection lowers the propensity to steal by 
1.5 percentage points if the amount of the fine is $2. If the penalty for stealing is $3, the same 
five-percentage point increase in the probability of detection generates a decline in the 
propensity to steal by 2.5 percentage points. A one dollar increase in the penalty reduces the 
propensity to steal by 3.5 percentage points if the probability of getting caught is 40%. 
However, if the probability of getting caught is 50%, the same one-dollar increase in fine 
generates a decline in theft propensity by 5.5 percentage points. 
                                                 
12  In these specifications, the variable Oldest Child is coded as 1 if the person has no siblings.  Alternatively, 
assigning the value of zero to Oldest Child when the person is the only child had no impact on the results.  
Excluding the Oldest Child variable did not change the results either.   13 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 report the estimation results of the model using the 
high school sample and with the addition of personal characteristics of the individuals. 
Column (3) displays the estimated coefficients from the linear probability model, and column 
(4) shows the marginal effects obtained from probit. The entries in column (4) represent the 
average marginal effect of the corresponding variable on the propensity to steal. The impact 
of the interaction term is implicitly incorporated into the probability of getting caught and 
into the fine variable when calculating the marginal effects.  
Table 7A displays these impacts in a compact fashion. The Panel A of Table 7A 
reports the marginal impact of the fine, obtained from both the linear probability 
specification  (column 3) and the probit specification (column 4) that employ the high school 
sample, when the probability of getting caught ranges from 35% to 65%. An increase in the 
certainty of punishment, represented by higher chances of getting caught, increases the 
impact of the fine. 
Panel B of the table reports the exercise from the other angle, and displays the 
calculated impact of an increase in the certainty of punishment when the severity of 
punishment gets bigger. The deterrent effect of the probability of getting caught gets bigger 
as the severity of punishment (represented by the magnitude of the fine) gets larger.  
Table 7B presents the results of the same exercise, but in this case, we use the entire 
sample (high school student and college students). As in Table 7A, the results are based on 
two specifications: the linear probability model reported in column 2 of Table 6, and the 
corresponding probit model. The results are very similar to those displayed in Table 7A. The 
impact of the penalty gets larger as the probability of detection is higher. Similarly, the 
impact of the probability of detection gets larger as the penalty increases.   14 
In order to investigate whether the results differ between the individuals who stole 
more frequently and those who did not steal as frequently, we re-estimated the models using 
only the individuals who stole six or fewer times during the experiment, and then using those 
who stole 7-to-13 times. Table 8 presents the marginal effects obtained from both the linear 
probability and the probit models in the sample of frequent stealers (those who decided to 
steal more than six times during the experiment) as well as less-frequent stealers. The 
marginal effects of the probability of getting caught and the fine are always negative. As 
before, the impact of the certainty (severity) of punishment gets larger as the severity 
(certainty) goes up. It is interesting to note that, although the marginal effects are somewhat 
larger in the sample of those who stole more frequently, the elasticity of theft with respect to 
fine and with respect to the probability of getting caught is larger in the sample of less-
frequent thefts. This is primarily because the baseline propensity to steal is lower in the group 
of people who did not steal as frequently. This means that a given percentage-point decline in 
the propensity to steal is translated into a larger percent change and therefore a larger 
elasticity. For example, in Panel A of Table 8 we see that when the probability of getting 
caught is 45%, the marginal effect of the fine is about  -0.07 among those who stole more 
than six times, and it is -0.03 among those who stole less than seven times. However, the 
elasticity of theft with respect to fine is -0.28 in the former group, while it is -1.98 in the 
latter group.  
 
IV. Discussion and Conclusion 
The extent to which criminals and potential criminals respond to variations in 
deterrence is an important issue, both theoretically and from a public policy perspective.   15 
Despite significant progress in recent empirical analyses in identifying the causal effect of 
deterrence on crime, objections are still raised on the validity of methods proposed to 
eliminate the simultaneity between crime and deterrence in empirical analyses, and some 
social scientists continue to argue that criminal activity does not respond to sanctions. The 
issue is important because it involves fundamental arguments about the rationality of 
individuals in their decisions to engage in illegal acts and whether individuals respond to 
changes in the costs of crime, such as the probability of punishment and the penalty they 
face, if caught.  
 In this paper we analyze individuals’ responses to potential criminal opportunities 
and the associated costs in an experimental setting. In our experiment subjects are exposed to 
exogenous variations in the relative tradeoffs between three important aspects of criminal 
opportunities – the amount of money they can steal from another person, the probability of 
getting caught, and the penalty (fine) they pay if caught. We conducted the experiment with 
juveniles and young adults, age groups that are near the peak ages for participation in petty 
crime and who are frequently labeled as “irrational” and “unresponsive to deterrence.”   
The instructions of the experiment employed loaded language, using the words 
“criminal,” “victim,” “stealing,” “getting caught” repeatedly, to explicitly underline the 
dishonest nature of the act. The experimental design always gave the option of not stealing. 
We find that the propensity to steal responds to exogenous variations in the amount of money 
available to steal, and in the certainty and severity of punishment. An increase in the 
probability of getting caught reduces the propensity to steal, and the same is true for an 
increase in the size of the penalty. The elasticity of theft with respect to the fine is bigger 
than the elasticity with respect to the probability of getting caught. Furthermore, the impact   16 
of the certainty of getting caught is larger when the penalty is bigger. Similarly, the deterrent 
effect of the penalty is bigger when the probability of getting caught is bigger. 
 The caveats are that the “criminals” in these experiments are not necessarily 
criminals outside the laboratory, and that the crimes do not involve very large financial gains 
or losses, and because of the anonymity they do not involve social sanctions. Given these 
qualifications, these results demonstrate that individuals’ decisions to commit crime are 
consistent with the predictions obtained from economic models, in that exogenous changes in 





Sample Bundles, from Choice Set # 5 
           
Mark one choice 
below 
Amount to steal 
from the victim 
Chance of being 
caught 
Fine if you are 
caught 
  $0.00  0%  $0.00 
  $2.00  75%  $0.10 
  $2.00  50%  $2.10 
  $2.00  25%  $4.10 
  $4.00  75%  $1.90 
  $4.00  50%  $3.90 
  $6.00  75%  $3.70 
  $8.00  75%  $5.50 
















1  $2.00,  $8.00  25%, 75%  $0.10,  $5.70 
2  $2.00, $8.00  25%, 75%  $0.10, $2.90 
3  $2.00, $8.00  25%, 75%  $0.10, $5.70 
4  $2.00, $8.00  25%, 75%  $0.10, $2.90 
5  $2.00, $8.00  25%, 75%  $0.10, $5.50 
6  $2.00, $8.00  25%, 75%  $0.10, $2.80 
7  $2.00, $8.00  25%, 75%  $0.10, $5.50 
8  $2.00, $8.00  25%, 75%  $0.10, $2.80 
9  $2.00, $6.00  25%, 75%  $0.10, $4.10 
10  $2.00, $6.00  25%, 75%  $0.10, $2.10 
11  $1.00, $6.00  55%, 55%  $0.60, $0.60 
12  $1.00, $6.00  55%, 55%  $1.80, $1.80 
13  $1.00, $6.00  5%, 5%  $0.10, $0.10 
 
In each of the 13 choice sets, there is one option with loot=$0.00, the probability of getting caught=0% , 
and fine=$0.0. This is the option of not stealing. Thus, the actual minimum values of the loot, the 
probability of getting caught and the fine are 0.0 in each round. The values in the table pertain to the 
minimum and maximum values among the choices that involve theft.     19 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics of Personal Characteristics 
       
Variable  Definition  High 
School  Undergraduate 
Age  Age of the individual  16.86 
(1.30)  NA 
Height  Height of the individual in feet  5.60 
(0.36)  NA 
GPA* 
High school GPA if the 
individual is in high school; the 
average of high school and 
college GPAs if the in college 
3.46 
(0.50)  NA 
Money  How much money the individual 
spends on his/her own per week 
20.72 
(28.36)  NA 
Male  Dichotomous variable (=1) if the 
person is male  0.41  NA 
One Sibling* 
 
Dichotomous variable (=1) if the 
person has one sibling   0.47  NA 
Two or more* 
Siblings 
Dichotomous variable (=1) if the 
person has two or more siblings   0.46  NA 
Oldest Child 
Dichotomous variable (=1) if the 
The person is the oldest child in 
the family 
0.48  NA 
Years in 
Eugene 
The number of years the person 
lived in Eugene, Oregon 
9.75 
(3.61)  NA 
N    82  34 
* GPA information is missing for 3 students; sibling information is missing for 1 
student. Socio-demographic data were not collected from the college sample. 
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  Table 4 
Number of Thefts 
   







0  5  4.31% 
1  1  0.86% 
2  1  0.86% 
3  1  0.86% 
4  1  0.86% 
5  3  2.59% 
6  2  1.72% 
7  4  3.45% 
8  2  1.72% 
9  8  6.90% 
10  9  7.76% 
11  5  4.31% 
12  19  16.38% 
13  55  47.41% 
Total  116  100% 
*The number of thefts is the number of choice sets 
where the individual stole money. Thus, 0 indicates 
that the individual did not steal money during the entire 
experiment, and 13 indicates that he/she stole in every 
choice set.    21 
Table 5 
  The Impact of Rewards and Sanctions on the Propensity to Steal 
                                                                                                                                                                               
 
 
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Loot  0.033***  0.040***  0.034***  0.051***  0.046*** 
  (0.006)  (0.013)  (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
Probability of  -0.003***  -0.002**  -0.003***  -0.005***  -0.004*** 
  getting caught  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Fine  -0.058***  -0.043***  -0.055***  -0.072***  -0.068*** 
  (0.010)  (0.015)  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.011) 
Age        0.013  0.012 
        (0.031)  (0.029) 
Male        0.383***  0.342*** 
        (0.088)  (0.074) 
Height        -0.201  -0.173 
        (0.143)  (0.129) 
GPA        0.053  0.050 
        (0.080)  (0.078) 
Endowment        -0.006  -0.005 
        (0.010)  (0.009) 
Money        0.001  0.001 
        (0.002)  (0.002) 
Years in Eugene        -0.018*  -0.015* 
        (0.009)  (0.009) 
One Sibling        0.063  0.077 
        (0.144)  (0.147) 
Two or more                                                                          
siblings        0.294* 
(0.149)        
0.290** 
(0.146) 
Oldest child        -0.007  0.005 
        (0.072)  (0.070) 
Sample  High 
school  College  Pooled  Pooled  Pooled 
Individual FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No 
R-squared  0.09  0.12  0.10  0.22  0.18
# 
N  2,509  626  3,135  2,368  2,368 
Standard  errors,  reported  in  parentheses,  are  clustered  at  the  individual  level.  Statistical 
significance of the coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are indicated by *, **, and ***. 
Models in columns (1)-(4) are estimated by OLS. Column (5) reports the average marginal 
effects obtained from maximum likelihood probit.  # represents pseudo-R square.    22 
Table 6 
The Impact of Rewards and on the Propensity to Steal (with interaction) 
 
            
   
Variable  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Loot     0.065***     0.067***      0.099***     0.090*** 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.010) 
Probability of  0.0003  0.001  0.0001  -0.007*** 
  Getting caught                    (0.0009)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Fine  0.038**  0.045***  0.073***  -0.097*** 
  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.021)  (0.012) 
Probability x   -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.003***   
   Fine  (0.0003)  (0.0003)  (0.0005)   
Age      0.0121  0.011 
      (0.029)  (0.028) 
Male      0.364***  0.322*** 
      (0.085)  (0.070) 
Height      -0.189  -0.156 
      (0.137)  (0.123) 
GPA      0.050  0.048 
      (0.078)  (0.076) 
Endowment      -0.005  -0.004 
      (0.009)  (0.009) 
Money      0.001  0.001 
      (0.002)  (0.002) 
Years in Eugene      -0.017*  -0.014* 
      (0.009)  (0.008) 
One Sibling      0.059  0.069 
      (0.143)  (0.143) 
Two or more        




Oldest child      -0.008  0.003 
      (0.069)  (0.068) 
Sample 
 
High School    
 
Pooled  High School 
 
High School 
Individual FE    Yes  Yes  No  No 
R-squared  0.14  0.20  0.25  0.25
# 
N  2,509  3,402  2,368  2,368 
Standard errors, reported in parentheses, are clustered at the individual level. Statistical 
significance of the coefficients at the 10%, 5% and 1% level are indicated by *, **, and 
***.  Models in columns (1)-(3) are estimated by OLS. Column (4) reports the average 
marginal effects obtained from maximum likelihood probit. The estimated probit model 
includes an interaction term for (probability of getting caught) x (fine). The reported 
marginal effects of the probability of getting caught and the fine implicitly include the 
impact of the interaction term. # represents the pseudo-R square value.                                                                                                                                                23 
 
Table 7A 
The Effect of Certainty and Severity of Punishment  
(High School Sample) 
  Panel A 
  Linear Probability Model 
  Probability of Getting Caught 
  35%  45%  55%  65% 
                
       








  Probit 
  Probability of Getting Caught 
  35%  45%  55%  65% 
                










   
  Panel B 
  Linear Probability Model 
  Fine 
  $1  $1.5  $2  $2.5  $3 
                












  Probit 
  Fine 
  $1  $1.5  $2  $2.5  $3 
                

















The entries are the changes in the probability of stealing as fine goes up by $1, or as the probability of 
getting caught goes up by 1 percentage point based on models in columns (3) and (4) of Table 6.  The 
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Table 7B 
The Effect of Certainty and Severity of Punishment 
(Pooled Sample) 
  Panel A 
  Linear Probability Model 
  Probability of Getting Caught 
  35%  45%  55%  65% 
                










  Probit 
  Probability of Getting Caught 
  35%  45%  55%  65% 
                










   
  Panel B 
  Linear Probability Model 
  Fine 
  $1  $1.5  $2  $2.5  $3 
                












  Probit 
  Fine 
  $1  $1.5  $2  $2.5  $3 
                

















The entries are the changes in the probability of stealing as fine goes up by $1, or as the probability of 
getting caught goes up by 1 percentage point.  The specification is the one reported in column (2) of Table 
6, and it is estimated by both OLS and probit. Standard errors are calculated using the Delta method. 
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Table 8 
The Effect of Certainty and Severity of Punishment by Frequency of Stealing                          
(Pooled Sample) 
  Panel A 
  Frequent Theft (>6) 
  Linear Probability Model 
  Probability of Getting Caught 
  35%  45%  55%  65% 
 
                



















   
  Less Frequent Theft (<7) 
  Linear Probability Model 
  Probability of Getting Caught 
  35%  45%  55%  65% 
 
                



















  Panel B 
  Frequent Theft (>6) 
  Linear Probability Model 
  Fine 
  $1  $1.5  $2  $2.5  $3 
 
                























   
  Less Frequent Theft (<7) 
  Linear Probability Model 
  Fine 
  $1  $1.5  $2  $2.5  $3 
                
























The entries are the changes in the probability of stealing as fine goes up by $1, or as the probability of 
getting caught goes up by 1 percentage point. The specification is the one reported in column (2) of Table 
6, and it is estimated by both OLS and probit. Standard errors are calculated using the Delta method.  26 
Appendix – Protocol 
 
Welcome:   
 
Today we are conducting an experiment about decision-making. Your decisions are for real 
money, so pay careful attention to these instructions. This money comes from a research 
foundation. How much you earn will depend on the decisions that you make, the decisions of 




All your decisions will be secret and we will never reveal them to anyone. We will ask you to 
mark your decisions on paper forms using a pen or pencil. If you are discovered looking at 
another person’s forms, or showing your form to another person, we cannot use your decisions in 
our study and so you will not get paid. Please do not talk during the experiment.  
 
Payment:   
 
You have been given a packet. Stapled to this packet is a card with a number on it. This is your 
claim check number. Each participant has a different number. Please tear off your card now. Be 
sure that your claim check number is written on top of the first page of your packet, but do not 
turn the page until instructed to do so. Be sure to keep your claim check number. You will 
present this number to an assistant in exchange for your payment envelope.  
 
The Experiment:  
 
You are going to play a game today. In this game you will be randomly and anonymously paired 
with another person in the room. One of you will be the criminal, and the other will be the 
victim. You will not know who you are paired with, even after the game is over.  
 
Each person will start with some money, but the amount of money each person gets may be 
different. You will start with either $16, $12, or $8. Your starting endowment has been 
determined randomly. The amount you start with is recorded on your packet.  
 
The criminal will have a chance to steal some of the victim’s money. However, stealing is not 
without a risk. If the criminal decides to steal some of the victim’s money, there is a chance that 
the criminal is caught. If the criminal is caught, then he or she will have to return the money 
taken from the victim, and also pay a fine to the experimenter. The chance that the criminal is 
caught, and the amount of the fine, depend on the choice made by the criminal.  
 
Everyone received one packet, and each packet contains 13 different sheets stapled together. We 
will show you an example. We call these Choice Sheets.  
 
On each Choice Sheet everyone will make a choice as if you are the criminal. You will declare 
your choice of how much money to steal from the victim by putting a check mark next to one of 
the choices.    27 
 
When we play the game the amount of money you will end up with will really be determined by 
the choices you make, so you want to consider your choice very carefully. We will give you 60 
seconds on the first page and 30 seconds on each subsequent page. Please leave your pen on the 
desk and do not mark your choice until I ask you to do so. When the time is up I will ask you to 
place a check mark next to the choice you want. It is important that you wait until the time is up 
to mark your choice.  
 
After everyone has made a choice on each of the 13 Choice Sheets, you will have a chance to 
reconsider each of your decisions just to make sure you have considered each choice carefully. If 
you wish to change your decision, please cross out your old decision and mark your new 
decision with a red pen. We will give you 30 seconds on the first page and 15 seconds on each 
subsequent page. Please leave your pen on the desk and do not mark your choice until I ask you 
to do so. When the time is up I will ask you to place a check mark next to the choice you want. It 
is important that you wait until the time is up to mark your choice.  
 
Next we have to determine who will be the criminal and who will be the victim. We randomly 
assign roles by flipping a coin. If it comes up heads, then those whose claim check number is 
even will be assigned the role of the criminal, and those whose claim check number is odd will 
be assigned the role of the victim. Should the coin come up tails, then those whose claim check 
number is odd will be assigned the role of the criminal, and those whose claim check number is 
even will be assigned the role of the victim.  
 
Now we have to pick which one of the 13 Choice Sheets will count. We will pick a random 
number from 1 to 13, by having your teacher draw a card from a deck of 13 cards. The Ace will 
stand for 1, the Jack, Queen, and King will stand for 11, 12, and 13 respectively. The number of 
the card will determine which Choice Sheet counts. We will have you turn your packet to that 
choice sheet.  
 
Note that you don’t know which of your 13 decisions will count before you make all of your 
decisions, if any. This will be determined purely by chance. So, the best thing for you to do is to 
treat every choice sheet as if it will count, and make the choice on that sheet that you most 
prefer.  
 
In the final step of the game we have to determine whether or not the criminal is caught. Here is 
how this will work:  We have 4 index cards. On each index card there is a percentage written. 
They are:  25%, 50%, 75% and 100%. We will randomly choose one of these index cards. 
Everybody looks at their choice on the Choice Sheet that has just been selected. If you are the 
criminal, and if the percentage written on the selected index card is less than or equal to the 
chance of being caught for the choice you made on the Choice Sheet, then you are caught. You 
will have to return the money you stole from the victim and pay the corresponding fine to the 
experimenter. Otherwise you keep the money.  
 
Now we will collect your decision packets and calculate your payments. To calculate your 
payments, we will randomly match one criminal with one victim. To get your envelope, we will 
ask you to fill out a receipt to be returned to us.    28 
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